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Comments
The Pre-Arraignment Lineup:
Necessity of a Magistrate
At a time when the Constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
criminally accused now cover almost every aspect of criminal pro-
cedure1 from the time of the arrest, through and including the
appellate levels,2 there is one procedure during one brief time span
when the accused is not afforded any remedial safeguards. The
procedure is the lineup; the time is that interval from the arrest
to the arraignment.3
It is the purpose of this article to discuss pre-arraignment lineups
and showups, 4 as distinguished from post-arraignment pretrial
1. See: R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1957);
D. NEDURD, THE CRIMINAL LAW (1967, 1968, 1969); M. TOBIAS & R. PETER-
SON, PRE TRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1972).
2. For example: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to
attorney at custodial interrogations); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (basic right to attorney).
3. Arraignment, as the term is used in this article, is the time when
the defendant is formally appraised of the charges against him.
4. [A] "showup" [is] the presentation of the suspect alone to the
victim or other identifying eyewitness. A showup is always some-
what suggestive, for the victim is given no other choice.
A "lineup" is the presentation to the victim of several alterna-
tive choices. If properly conducted, it certainly presents a lesser
danger of mistaken identification although even the most correct
procedures cannot remove all danger. N. SOBEL, EYE-WTNEss
IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, 6 (1972).
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lineups.5 Lineups and showups are of such an untrustworthy
nature that to permit their use prior to arraignment is realistically
to impose, in a great number of instances, an irreparable "taint"
on the accused6 even before "the beginning of the adversary pro-
ceedings."'7 The rationale given by the judiciary for not bringing
safeguards into play at this stage of the process is, faulty; it is the
intention of this article to suggest measures to correct this judicial
myopia.
There are to be three phases to this article: first, the documenta-
tion of the "untrustworthiness" of the lineup as an investigatory
or prosecutorial tool; second, an exposition of the present state of
the law regarding pre-arraignment lineups and an analysis of
the rationale behind that law; and, finally, a suggested remedial
procedure that in the opinion of these authors will protect the
rights of an accused during the pre-arraignment lineup.
The lineup is, of course, nothing more than eyewitness identifi-
cation, and the criticism leveled at eyewitness identification is both
monumental and documented.8  Justice Frankfurter, addressing
himself to eyewitness identification, said of such procedure:
5. This is the interval between the defendant's arraignment and trial,
which was covered by United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
6. The influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses
probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other
single factor-perhaps it is responsible for more such errors than
all other factors combined. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
at 229 quoting P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL
CASES, 26 (1965).
7. In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) the court defines
when the adversary proceeding begins:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere
formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adver-
sary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has
committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse posi-
tions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that
a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of
organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive
and procedural criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks
the commencement of the "criminal prosecutions" to which alone
the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable.
8. Murray, The Criminal Lineup At Home and Abroad, 1966 UTAH L.
REV. 610. This article states at 610: "Almost all, knowledgeable authori-
ties agree that eyewitness identification is the most unreliable form of
proof." Also, cited in this article are the following sources: E. BLOCK,
THE VINDICAORS (1963); J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957); E.
GARDNER, THE COURT Or LAST RESORT (1952); Q. REYNOLDS, COURTROOM
* . . What is the worth of identification testimony even when un-
contradicted? The identification of strangers is proverbially un-
trustworthy. The hazards of such testimony are established by a
formidable number of instances in the records of English and
American trials. These instances are recent-not due to the bru-
talities of ancient criminal procedure. 9
The barrage of criticism directed toward eyewitness identification
has not been confined solely to the legal field o but appears to
(1950); E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932). Another source of
material, articles and books was given by the Court in United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 n.6, 7:
* . . Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases; 3 Wig-
more, Evidence § 786a (3d ed 1940); Rolph, Personal Identity;
Gross, Criminal Investigation 47-54 (Jackson ed 1962); Williams,
Proof of Guilt 83-89 (1955); Wills, Circumstantial Evidence 192-
205 (7th ed. 1937); Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof §§ 250-
253 (3d ed 1937) .... Napley, Problems of Effecting the Presen-
tation of the Case for a Defendant, 66 Col L Rev 94, 98-99 (1966);
Williams, Identification Parades, (1955) Crim L. Rev. (Eng) 525;
Paul, Identification of Accused Persons, 12 Austl LJ 42 (1938);
Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades, Part I & II, 1963
Crim L Rev 479-490, 545-555; Gorphe, Showing Prisoners to Wit-
nesses for Identification, 1 Am J Police Sci 79 (1930); . . . Devlin,
The Criminal Prosecution in England 70; ...
See, Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap
From Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079 (1973) wherein Judge Carl
McGowan (U.S. Court of Appeals) is quoted from his lecture on Constitu-
tional Interpretation and Criminal Identification, during the 4th Annual
G.B. Sherwell Lecture at Marshall-Wythe School of Law in October, 1970.
Also printed in 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235 (1970). Judge McGowan
states:
[T]he vagaries of visual identification have been thought by many
experts to present what is conceivably the greatest threat to the
achievement of our ideal that no innocent man shall be punished.
[Later in the lecture Judge McGowan discusses United States v.
Wade, supra.] . . . [T] he court in Wade viewed the lineup as a
critical stage because the confrontantion compelled by the
state between the accused and the victim or witness to a crime to
elicit identification evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable
dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially
derogate from a fair trial .... Among these factors were the well-
known vagaries of eye-witness identification, the potential for
improper intentional and unintentional suggestion, and the emo-
tional state of the witness. Levine & Tapp, supra at 1081-82.
Even the California Supreme Court has recognized what a danger unfair
lineups posed:
[W]e do no more than recognize, as did the United States Su-
preme Court [in Wade], that unfairly constituted lineups have in
the past too often brought about the conviction of the innocent.
People v. Caruso, 68 Cal. 2d 183, 188; 436 P.2d 336, 340 (1968).
9. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
10. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967) cites Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades,
supra note 8, as one of the most comprehensive works in this area and
the court quotes from the book on page 235 of the opinion:
[T]he fact that the police themselves have, in a given case, little
or no doubt that the man put up for identification has committed
the offense, and that their chief pre-occupation is with the problem
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be a rather pervasive feeling among researchers. Commenting on
the limits of the human memory and perception systems, one such
legal scholar has stated:11
of getting sufficient proof, because he has not 'come clean' in-
volves a danger that this persuasion may communicate itself to the
witness in some way.
Murray, supra note 8, at page 610 n.2 makes the following observations
about the reliability of eyewitness perception:
An analysis of the testimony of 20,000 persons who were asked to
describe the physical characteristics of the man they saw commit
a crime . . . "revealed that, on average, they overestimated the
height by 5 inches, the age by 8 years, and gave the wrong hair
color in 87% of the case. . . ." It is well known that, because of
disturbed emotions at the time of the crime, the victim of a rape
or robbery is most likely to be an inaccurate observer of what then
went on....
A person who eyewitnessed the crime, when he first talks to the
police, may have no clear recollection of the man he saw. The po-
lice and prosecutor may work on the eyewitness by subtle and
repeated questions until he loses his initial uncertainty about a
suspect and finally, without hesitation declares him the man who
did the deed.
Another source of information of eyewitness identification is P. WALL,
EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (2d ed. 1971). Wall
writes the following concerning the basis of incorrect identifications:
What are the causes of the erroneous identifications which,
either in their actuality or their possibility, so vex the administra-
tion of criminal justice? Basically, there are two causes: 1) the
normal and universal fallibilities of human sense perception and
human memory, and 2) the susceptibility of the human mind to
suggestive influences. Wall, supra at 8-9.
Other authors have commented on this problem: Gardner, The Percep-
tion and Memory of Witnesses, 18 Cornell L. Rev. 391, 401 (1933), "Imag-
ination and suggestion are twin artists ever ready to retouch the fading
daguerrotype of memory." Brown, Legal Psychology, 90 (1926), "Sugges-
tion not only creates artifical memory out of nothing, but it changes ex-
isting memories to suit its own ends." Wall, supra at 10 clearly indicates
the reasons for individuals making mistakes:
The cause of this apparent anomaly is the fact that the normal per-
sons sees but a few of someone else's distinguishing characteristics,
retains even fewer in his mind, and is able to revive fewer still
when asked to describe the person observed or to identify one
thought to be the same.
11. These medical articles and books discuss the development and
functioning of the sensory and memory systems and the frailities that ex-
ist therein: D. KIMBLE, READINESS TO REMEMBER (1969); P. HERRIOT, ORGAN-
ISATION AND MEMORY (1973); W. KINTScH, LEARNING, MEMORY, AND CON-
CEPTUAL PROCESSES (1970); J. PENNYCUICK, IN CONTACT WITH THE PHYSICAL
WORLD (1971); J. KENNEDY, A PSYCHOLOGY OF PICTURE PERCEPTION (1974);
W. DEMBER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERCEPTION (1963); R. ROMMETVEIT, SELEC-
TIVITY, INTUITION AND HALO EFFECTS IN SOCIAL PERCEPTION (1960); J. COHEN,
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION (1969); D. RAVAPORT, EMOTIONS AND MEMORY,
183-237, (5th ed. 1971); G. KLEIN, PERCEPTION, MOTIVES, AND PERSONALITY
(1970).
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We all know from our experience-and psychologists from their
professional training and practice-that people quite often do not
see or hear things which are presented clearly to their senses, see
or hear things which are not there, do not remember things which
have happened to them, and remember things which did not hap-
pen. 12
These 'same frailities have also been subject to medical comment:
People fabricate events that have not occurred in order to please,
do not report events that have occurred to escape censure, change
their thinking to suit a variety of motives, use terms that do not
have shared meanings, forget, contradict themselves, distort experi-
ences, and vary experiences with changes in the interpersonal and
nonhuman environment.18
A distinguished jurist, Carl McGowan,14 in discussing 5 Con-
gressional passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1963,16 stated:
A striking example of the popular attitude towards eyewitness
identification appeared in the Senate Committee hearing on the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. . . [T] he
Committee labelled eyewitness testimony 'an essential prosecu-
tional tool' and accused the Supreme Court of having struck 'a
harmful blow at the nationwide effort to control crime. . .' Yet
inaccurate identification has been and continues to be a major
source of faulty convictions. 1"
Untrustworthiness of eyewitness identification cannot be realisti-
cally questioned in light of the overwhelming damnation of its
veracity.
Concern over the nature of eyewitness identification is very real
because the initial identification which frequently takes place at
a pre-arraignment lineup all too often may prove devastating to
the defense of the suspect. As pointed out by numerous authori-
ties, the uncertainty initially surrounding the identification very
12. Levine & Tapp, supra note 8, at 1087-88. Also cited in Kubie,
Implications for Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human Memory, 108
U. PA. L. REv. 59 (1959).
13. M. HOROWITZ, IMAGE FORMATION AND COGNITION, 4 (1970). Doctor
Mardi Jon Horwitz is a research psychiatrist at Mount Zion Hospital and
Medical Center besides being Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at
the University of California School of Medicine, San Francisco, California.
14. Member of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.
15. Three cases must be considered within this context: United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3502 (1970). It is interesting to note that the constitu-
tionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3502 (1970) has been questioned: Recent Statute,
Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1392 (1969).
17. Levine & Tapp, supra note 8, at 1082.
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often becomes a "certainty" by the time of the trial.' Murray dis-
cusses precisely that problem:
Then, at the trial, this eyewitness testifies so positively that cross-
examination does not create any doubt in the jury's mind, and they
believe the witness's testimony that the defendant was the cul-
prit . ."19
Because of the frailties of human perception and retention, the
use of eyewitness identification should be employed only within cer-
tain parameters which afford the suspect some degree of protection.
The French moralist, Jean de La Bruy~re, provides in one passage
all the rationale necessary for remedial action:
[T] he condemnation of an innocent person is the affair of all honest
men. I might almost say in regard to myself, 'I will not be a thief
or a murderer; but to say, 'I shall not some day be punished as
such,' would be to speak very boldly.2O
This reason is in itself sufficient to justify taking a hard look at
any procedure dependent upon eyewitness identification.
18. See: Sobel, Assailing the Impermissible Suggestion: Evolving Lim-
itations on the Abuse of Pretrial Criminal Identification Methods, BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 261 (1971). Sobel states at 265-66 of the article:
Before a trial can be obtained, the uncertain identification must
necessarily become a positive identification in order to survive the
preliminary examination and the grand jury. Indeed, experience
establishes then an initial uncertain identification becomes more
and more positive at every successive stage of the proceeding and
through the trial itself....
If the initial identification was, however, mistaken or uncertain
then an innocent man is on trial. The initial "mistake" will inev-
itably be carried through all future identifications. Rarely if ever
will the witness who was positive at the initial identification or
who has become positive by virture of suggestion, express any
doubt in the several later judicial proceedings, including the trial.(emphasis added)
Also: Comment, No Panacea: Constitutional Supervision of Eyewitness
Identification, 62 J. CRiM. L. C. & P. S. 363 (1971); P. Mueller, Right to
Counsel at Police Identification Proceedings: A Problem in Effective Im-
plementation of an Expanding Constitution, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 65 (1968);
F. Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable Ex-
travagance, 17 UCLA L. REV. 339 (1970); A Biemiller, Lawyers and Lineups
77 YALE L. J. 390 (1967); N. SOBEL, EYE-WrrNEss IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL
AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS (1972); GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
EViDENcE IN CRIMINAL CASES, 209-30 (1969 ed.); Case Note, Criminal Law
-The Lineup's Lament, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 660 (1973); Protection of the
Accused at Police Lineups, 6 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 345 (1970);
RINGEL, IDENTIFICATION AND POLICE LINE-UPS (1968); Comment, The Cali-
fornia Constitution and Counsel at Pretrial Lineups: Disneyland Claims
or Deadly Serious Business?, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 83 (1974).
19. Murray, supra note 8, at 610.
20. LA BRUYtRE, LES CARACTERS (1668), quoted in Wall, supra note 10,
The lineup, dependent as it is on eyewitness identification, is at
best suspect and at its worst is completely prejudicial. In response
to the harshness engendered by the lineup and because of the com-
plete lack of safeguards afforded the accused at a pre-arraignment
lineup, the last five years have seen various proposals for remedial
action spring forth from -the literature.21 A review of the litera-
ture and an analysis of the state of the 'law indicate two avenues
of assault by which this gap in protecting the rights of the accused
can be filled.
This first avenue of assault is constructed upon the Sixth Amend-
ment's22 right to counsel. The foundation cases in this area are
the companion cases of United States v. Wade23 and Gilbert v.
California.24 In Wade, the post-arraignment pretrial lineup is
characterized as a "critical stage" of the proceedings and, as such,
entitles the defendant to the presence of counsel at the identifica-
tion procedures: 25
Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice, inten-
tional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which may not be capable of
reconstruction at trial, and since presence of counsel itself can often
avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial,
there can be little doubt that for Wade the post-indictment lineup
was a critical stage of the prosecution at which he was 'as much
entitled to such aid [of counsel] . . . as at the trial itself.' 26
The court went a step further in Gilbert as it developed the "per
se" exclusionary rule27-if testimony of a tainted pretrial identi-
fication (e.g., no attorney present for the lineup) is forwarded as
part of the state's direct case, the conviction must be reversed.2
Upon rehearing, the state may overcome the exclusion of the in-
at 24. Also cited in EsmEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE 352 (1913).
21. See supra note 18.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which dis-
trict shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory proc-
ess for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defence [sic].
23. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
24. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
25. 388 U.S. at 236-37.
26. Id.
27. 388 U.S. at 273, the court states: "Only a per se exclusionary rule
as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure that law
enforcement authorities will respect the accused's constitutional right to
the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup." (emphasis added.)
28. Id. at 272.
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court identification by establishing a separate basis for this identi-
fication.29 The main thrust of the opinion establishes that in-
court identifications, further re-enforced by prosecutorial evidence
of pretrial confrontations, are subject to automatic reversal if the
pretrial confrontation is found to be in violation of the defendant's
constitutional rightsY0  But both Wade3 l and Gilbert 2 were
limited expressly to post-arraingment lineups.3
Accordingly, the !state of the law as to pre-arraignment lineups
was left in utter confusionA4 The confusion ended five years later
with Kirby v. Illinois.3 5 In Kirby the court held that constitutional
right to counsel did not attach until the defendant was formally
arrainged.3 6 Thus, it would appear that the law as currently con-
strued draws a clear distinction between post-arraignment and pre-
arraignment lineups,37 for the purposes of providing counsel.
The second avenue of assault is founded on basic due process 38
principles. The claim in this area is not that the defendant was
denied counsel during the lineup, but that the procedures of the
lineup itself were so "unfair" that the defendant was deprived of
due process of law.3 9 The due process line of reasoning as applica-
ble here was sounded in Stovall v. Denno.40 The Stovall court sets
29. Id.
30. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 272-74 (1967).
31. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
32. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
33. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 220 (1967); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 269 (1967).
34. People v. Fowler, 1 Cal.3d 335, 461 P.2d 643 (1969).
35. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
36. Id. at 689-91.
37. See Kirby v. fllinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684-85 (1972); Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia, 388 U.S. 263, 269-73 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
220 (1967).
38. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), discusses the factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether there has been a denial of due process.
The court stresses the "totality of the circumstances" and evaluates this in
terms of the following elements in identification/due process issues:
[T]he opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time
of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the
witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length
of time between the crime and the confrontation. Id. at 199.
39. Cases that have dealt with denial of due process: Coleman v. Ala-
bama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442 (1969);
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
40. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
forth a general standard to be followed in determining whether cer-
tain identification procedures violate a person's right to due process.
The test to be employed is whether "[t] he confrontation conducted
... was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification ... [as to deny due process to the ac-
cused]."' 4 1 The Court perfected the dictates of Stovall in Neil v.
Biggers42 by defining the nature of an unfair identification pro-
cedure:
It is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant's
right to due process .... Suggestive confrontations are disap-
proved because they increase the likelihood of misidentification,
and unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned for the further
reason that the increased chance of misidentification is gratui-
toUS. 48
Even with this attempt to define due process more clearly, it
remains an elusive concept.
Both approaches are lacking in that they fail to remedy the
procedure of the pre-arraignment lineup. An extension of the
Wade-Gilbert reasoning offers exclusion of the lineup in certain
instances, but even at that the remedial action is merely a stop-
gap procedure and entirely inadequate.4 4 Equally inadequate is
the Stovall-Biggers assault on the due process gaps within criminal
proceedings. The use of such imprecise terms and phrases as
"unfairness" 45, "unnecessarily suggestive" 4 :and "substantial like-
lihood of irreparable misidentification" 4 is testimony to the degree
of judicial uncertainty in attempting to conform the lineup to the
41. Id. at 301-02.
42. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
43. Id. at 198.
44. The exclusion in Wade-Gilbert is entirely unrealistic. If counsel
is not present at the lineup, the lineup is thrown out and the witness must
then at trial identify the accused disregarding the lineup and relying upon
the actual alleged criminal event. For the court to instruct the witness to
exclude from his mind the lineup so as to dissipate any "taint" that may
have occurred is such an unrealistic approach as to border on fantastic.
Clearly such an instruction is worthless as documented by a Supreme
Court statement in Wade:
Moreover, '[ilt is a matter of common experience that, once a
witness has picked out the accused at the lineup, he is not likely
to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of
identity may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for all
practical purposes be determined there and then, before the trial.'
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, at 229 quoting WILLIAMS AND
HAMMELMANN, IDENTIFICATION PARADES, Part I, Crim. L. Rev. 479,
482 (1963).
45. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299 (1967).
46. Id. at 302.
47. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972); Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
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requirements of "due process". Such non-standards place an undue
degree of discretion in the court and, consequently, inequities not
only may arise, but in all likelihood have already arisen and cer-
tainly will continue to arise.
For these reasons, a radical, perhaps even "Disneylike",48
approach must be taken. This radical departure involves the inter-
jection of a magistrate into the pre-arraignment lineup process. 49
The same rationale used to require a magistrate to review an
affidavit to determine if such contains facts sufficient to issue a
warrant should be made applicable to the pre-arraignment lineup.
Underlining the dictates of the Fourth Amendment 0 which make
a warrant mandatory is the rationale that there should be brought
into play a neutral and detached intermediary to determine if this
is such an occasion that would constitutionally justify a violation
of the sanctity of a person's home.51
Notwithstanding that the warrant procedure is a specific dictate
of the United States Constitution, 52 it is the position of these
authors that it is not unreasonable to draw 'an analogy between
the warrant procedure mandated by the Fourth Amendment and
the remedial proposals set forth hereinafter. The analogy is proper
because, in both instances, the desired end is to protect against
unreasonableness, i.e. the warrant procedure is designed to protect
against unreasonable searches and seizures and the proposed lineup
48. It is interesting to note that before the United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967), decision, arguments for counsel being present at POST
arraignment identification were considered a "Disneyland" contention.
Williams v. United States, 345 F.2d 733 (D.C. Cir. 1965); F. Read, supra
note 18, at 357; Comment, The California Constitution and Counsel at Pre-
trial Lineups: Disneyland Claims or Deadly Serious Business?, supra note
18, at 83, 93.
49. United States v. Pollard, 335 F. Supp. 868 (D.D.C. 1971), offers an
indicia tending towards the standarization of characteristics used during
the lineup.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
51. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948), more recently
cited in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
procedure is designed to protect against prejudicial misidentifica-
tion. In the latter, there is such an inherent possibility for error
and, consequently, such a serious invasion of a person's right to have
a fair trial on the merits, that a proposal of the nature presented
here is not without merit. Clearly a plausible argument can be
raised for interjecting a neutral participant into the arena at this
prearraignment stage to oversee the proceedings and provide some
safeguards against police and prosecutorial conduct in general.
The actual operation of this proposal shall be as follows: if
after the arrest of the suspect the police feel a lineup is warranted
for any number of reasons, they should require the witness, prior
to viewing the suspect, to give a written description of the suspect.
This description shall be given on a prepared form requesting the
witness to fill out an appropriate answer for each of the following
characteristics: height, weight, hair and skin color, characterization
of body build, and special information (e.g., scars or physical
defects). This completed description, the analogous document to
the affidavit required in the warrant procedure, shall then be pre-
sented to a magistrate, who will review it as to those salient
characteristics specified in the description. On the basis of this
description the magistrate shall issue an order 58 detailing charac-
terestics that all persons comprising the lineup must have in com-
mon.54 The police, upon obtaining the order, must conduct the
lineup in accordance with the order.
53. The order should be comprised of acceptable height and weight
ranges, build, color of hair and eyes, complexion, and any special charac-
teristics for .persons taking part in the lineup.
54. Criticism may be directed to a situation in which a witness is
unable to verbalize or articulate specific characteristics of a suspect and
yet that witness is assertive in his belief, that given a face-to-face en-
counter he would be able to identify the suspect. ("I'll know him if I see
him.") However, valid this criticism may or may not be is not relevant
to the remedial action as proposed herein. All that is demanded in the
proposed remedial action is a recitation of very general characteristics (i.e.,
general height in relation to witness, general coloring, etc.). If a person
is unable to give even such general characteristics the identification is of
such a nature that no lineup should be issued. To allow such a "gut-
reaction" identification, based on nothing more than a person's inarticula-
ble feeling, may well result in an unfounded prejudicial identification. As
noted by Wall, supra note 6, at 98 in which he quotes from Regina v.
Smith, [1952] Ont. 432, 436. That Canadian court maintained:
If the identification of an accused depends upon unreliable and
shadowy mental operations, without reference to any characteristic
which can be described by the witness, and he is totally unable to
testify what impressions moved his senses or stirred and clarified
his memory, such identification, if unsupported and alone, amounts
to little more than speculative opinion or unsubstantial conjecture,
and at its strongest is a most insecure basis upon which to found
that abiding and moral assurance of guilt necessary to eliminate
reasonable doubt.
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Further, at the lineup itself at least six persons must be present,
in addition to the accused, and a mandatory and thorough docu-
mentation of names, addresses, and descriptions of each person com-
prising the lineup must be prepared. 55 Copies of the order issued
by the magistrate, as well as the documentation of the lineup itself,
shall be made available to defense counsel upon request in order
that defense counsel may review the entire procedure.
This proposal has several distinct advantages over those ap-
proaches favored in the literature. 56 First of all, it is not subject
to the frailties of the Stovall-Biggers line of thinking in that judi-
cial discretion is severely restricted. It also embodies the due proc-
ess mandates so loftily spoken 'of in Stovall-Biggers without the
nebulousness of that standard.
Secondly, the proposed procedure provides an exact formula for
exclusion of the noncomplying lineup and would present a complete
bar to any identification by any witness present at an improperly
conducted lineup. If the suspect can establish that the lineup was
not in strict compliance with the proposal as presented above, that
lineup would be excluded.
The apparent lack of any safeguards for an accused from arrest
to arraignment and the inherent untrustworthiness of lineups in
general have motivated the authors to create a pre-arraignment
procedure, which in their opinion provides a concrete and viable
solution to these problems. The present alternatives forwarded by
case law and literature in 'this area are not wholly successful in
filling the gap and thus the authors have ventured their own alter-
native. The essential element of that alternative is the guiding
presence of the neutral magistrate to oversee the pre-arraignment
lineup.
HARRY M. CALDWELL
AND DOUGLAS S. SMrrH
55. See Appendix A.
56. Id.
Appendix A
1. Model standard set forth by Murray, The Criminal Lineup
at Home and Abroad, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 610, 627-28:
Most, if not all, of the attacks on the lineup process could be
averted by a uniform statute modeled upon the best features of the
civilian codes. Any proposed statute should provide for the right
to counsel during any lineup or during any confrontation. Provi-
sion should be made that any person, whether a victim or a witness,
must give a description of the suspect before he views any arrested
person. A written record of this description should be required,
and the witness should be made to sign it. This written record
would be available for inspection by defense counsel for copying
before the trial and for use at the trial in testing the accuracy of
the identification made during the lineup and during the trial.
This ideal statute would require at least six persons in addition to
the accused in a lineup, and these persons would have to be of ap-
proximately the same height, weight, coloration of hair and skin,
and bodily types as the suspect. In addition, all of these men
should, as nearly as possible, be dressed alike. If distinctive garb,
was used during the crime, the suspect should not be forced to wear
similar clothing in the lineup unless all of the other persons are
similarly garbed. A complete written report of the names, ad-
dresses, descriptive details of the other persons in the lineup, and
of everything which transpired during the identification would be
mandatory. This report would include everything stated by the
identifying witness during this step, including any reasons given
by him as to what features, etc., have sparked his recognition.
This statute should permit voice identification tests by having each
person in the lineup repeat identical innocuous phrases, and it
would be impermissible to force the use of words allegedly used
during a criminal act.
The statute would enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer
that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a sus-
pect. If more than one witness is to make an identification, each
witness should be required to do so separately and should be for-
bidden to speak to another witness until all of them have com-
pleted the process.
The statute could require the use of movie cameras and tape re-
corders to record the lineup process in those states which are finan-
cially able to afford these devices. Finally, the statute should pro-
vide that any evidence obtained as the result of a violation of this
statute would be inadmissible.
2. Model standard set forth by the 1972 Project on Law Enforce-
ment Policy and Rulemaking as established by College of Law,
Arizona State University:
Rule 401 Holding a Lineup: Exceptions.
When identification by a witness may be obtained, a lineup
should be held following the arrest of a suspect, unless one of the
following circumstances makes a lineup unwise or impractical:
A. Unusual Appearance of Suspect. Lack of suitable persons to
include in the lineup group (e.g., the suspect is very tall or very
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short; very young or very old; the suspect's hair length or facial
hair is unusual).
B. Prior Knowledge. The witness knew the identity of the sus-
pect before the offense occurred (e.g., personal acquaintance, rela-
tive, neighbor, co-worker); or learns his identity after the offense
without police assistance (e.g., a victim spots the suspect at his
place of employment, or an eyewitness recognizes the suspect's pic-
ture in the newspaper); or the prospective viewer has had an op-
portunity to identify the suspect in an earlier confrontation proce-
dure.
C. Inconvenience. The suspect is in custody at a place too far
from the witness.
D. Lack of Viewers. There is no witness willing or able to view
the lineup.
E. Uncooperative Suspect. The suspect threatens to disrupt the
lineup. (See Rules 408-09.)
F. Suspect Released from Custody. The suspect has been re-
leased on bond or recognizance before he can be viewed.
Rule 402 Time of the Lineup.
A lineup, when conducted, should take place as soon as practica-
ble after the arrest of a suspect. Lineup arrangements (contacting
viewers, obtaining innocent participants, arranging for a lawyer
when appropriate under Rule 405) should be completed prior to
the arrest whenever possible.
Rule 403 Right to a Lawyer.
A. General Rule. A suspect has the right to a lawyer for any
lineup connected with an offense for which he has been arrested
or charged-and to have a lawyer appointed for this purpose if he
cannot afford one-if the lineup is held following the start of crimi-
nal proceeding against him.
B. Limitation of Right to a Lawyer: Uncharged Offenses. Even
after criminal proceedings have been commenced against a suspect,
he does not have the right to a lawyer at a lineup relating to other
offenses which have not been formally charged against the suspect.
Rule 404 Advising the Suspect of His Right to a Lawyer.
A. Before Suspect Has Right to a Lawyer. If the lineup will
take place before the suspect has the right to a lawyer (see Rule
403), there is no obligation to advise the suspect about having a
lawyer at the lineup.
B. After Suspect Has Right to a Lawyer. If the lineup will take
place after the suspect has the right to a lawyer (see Rule 403),
the suspect must be told that he has the right to have a lawyer
present to observe the lineup procedure; that if he cannot afford
a lawyer, one will be provided for him free of charge; and that
the lineup will be delayed for a reasonable time after the lawyer
is notified, in order to allow the lawyer to appear.
[VOL. 3: 82, 1975) Pre-arraignment Lineup
Rule 405 Procedures Where Suspect Has Right to a Lawyer.
A. Counsel Already Retained. If the suspect already has a law-
yer-whether retained or appointed-and indicates that he wants
the lawyer to attend the lineup, he must be allowed to notify the
lawyer about the planned lineup and the offense involved.
B. Non-Indigent Suspect Without Lawyer. If the suspect has no
lawyer but wants one to attend the lineup, and the suspect states
that he can afford his own lawyer, he must be allowed a reason-
able time to retain a lawyer.
C. Indigent Suspect Without Lawyer. If the suspect has no law-
yer and wants one to attend the lineup, but states that he cannot
afford a lawyer, the officer conducting the lineup should contact
(insert name of appropriate agency) to provide a lawyer for him
free of charge.
D. Reasonable Delay. A lineup should be delayed for a reason-
able time while waiting for the lawyer to appear following notifi-
cation.
Rule 406 Waiver of Right to a Lawyer.
A suspect who is entitled to a lawyer at a lineup may waive this
right, provided he reads (or has read to him) and signs the Waiver
of Lawyer at a Lineup form, or makes an oral waiver heard by
at least two other persons. The oral statement must show that the
suspect has full knowledge of the effect of waiving the right, and
the precise words of the suspect's statement must be made part of
the investigation file.
Rule 407 Lineup Procedure.
A. Number of Participants. All lineups should consist of at
least four persons in addition to the suspect.
B. Physical similarity. Persons placed in the lineup should
have approximately similar physical characteristics. Factors such
as age, height, weight, hair length and color, and physical build
should be considered. Sex and race should be the same for all par-
ticipants, except in unusual cases where the characteristic is diffi-
cult to determine (e.g., female impersonator).
C. Positioning Suspect. The suspect should be informed that he
can choose his initial position in the lineup, and that he may change
his position after each viewing.
D. Eliminating Suggestion. Officers should not say or do any-
thing to distinguish the suspect from the other lineup participants.
E. Uniform Conduct of Participants. The non-suspects in the
lineup should be instructed to conduct themselves so as not to
single out the actual suspect.
F. Compelled Actions. The suspect can be instructed to utter
specified words, make gestures, or assume a particular pose, if the
viewer so desires. All participants should do whatever reasonable
act is required of the suspect.
G. Donning Distinctive Clothing. If a witness describes the
suspect as wearing a distinctive item of clothing, and the item (or
something similar) is in police custody, the suspect can be com-
pelled to wear the item. Each participant must don the clothing
in the order of his appearance in the lineup.
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H. Photographs. Photographs or video recordings shall be
taken of all lineups.
Rule 408 Refusal to Participate.
A. General Rule. A suspect who either refuses to participate
in a lineup or refuses to perform as required by Rule 407 shall be
informed that he has no right to refuse, and that evidence of his
refusal may be used against him at trial. A record of the precise
words of the suspect's refusal should be made for subsequent use.
B. Continuing Refusal. If the suspect continues his refusal, [in
most cases] he should not be forced to participate in the lineup or
to perform a certain act. [However, in some cases, subject to
approval from (insert name of appropriate official), compliance
may be forced. When this occurs, the other lineup participants
must fake resistance similar to that used by the suspect. This fak-
ing serves to eliminate suggestiveness but is only feasible where
police officers are the innocent participants.]
Rule 409 Role of the Suspect's Lawyer.
A. In General. The suspect's lawyer shall be allowed to consult
with him prior to the lineup, and to observe the lineup procedure.
He may make suggestions, but may not control or obstruct the
procedure.
B. Lawyer's Suggestions. Any suggestions the lawyer makes
about the procedure should be considered and recorded. Those
suggestions which would render the procedure more consistent with
these Rules should be implemented.
C. Lawyer's Participation. A lawyer should be permitted to be
present when a witness states his conclusion about the lineup.
However, the lawyer should be instructed (and required) to remain
silent during both the lineup and the giving of the witness' conclu-
sion. The lawyer may speak with any witness after the procedure,
if the witness agrees to speak with the lawyer.
D. Communication With the Witness. A witness taking part in
a lineup procedure may be told that he is under no obligation to
speak with the lawyer, but that he is free to speak with the lawyer
if he wishes. The witness' name and address should not be re-
vealed to the lawyer without the witness' consent.
Rule 410 Court-Ordered Detention for Appearance in a Lineup.
Where probable cause does not exist, or where otherwise desir-
able, a ct. order may be sought to compel cooperation of the suspect
in appearing in a lineup.
